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This information comes directly from the Washtenaw County website which is
"public domain." Except for formatting, no changes have been made to this
material. It is included herein with the specific knowledge of the County
webmaster. Further, as a Washtenaw County Circuit Court writing, this is neither
binding precedent nor governing dictate even on other judges in this specific
county.
Footnote 1: Written by The Honorable Judge John N. Kirkendall, Family Division, Washtenaw
County Trial Court, Ann Arbor, Michigan. The author gratefully acknowledges
contributions from the following lawyers and judges: Craig S. Ross, Esq.,
Washtenaw County Friend of the Court's Office; Norman N. Robbins, Esq., domestic
relations practitioner, author and lecturer; Hon. Bruce A. Newman, Genesee
County Probate Judge; Hon. Joan E. Young, Oakland County Circuit Judge; and
Monika H. Sacks, domestic relations practitioner, author and lecturer. They have
reviewed the chart and suggested additions and improvements. I thank Stuart D.
Lurie, law clerk, who has helped revise the chart since its first publication.
Errors are mine. The chart should be viewed as "evolving", not "finished."
Therefore, the reader's suggestions and comments will be helpful.
Footnote 12: Feldman v Feldman,
55 Mich. App. 147 (1974), custody granted to wife who had engaged in two
"adulterous affairs" but who was a "good mother and was in charge of sons'
religious education." Moral fitness is only one factor and on balance it is in
best interests of children for her to have custody. (In this case husband drank
toilet bowl cleaner in an effort to commit suicide.) Mother's act of
unfaithfulness or of adultery does not necessarily preclude her from being
awarded custody of her children. Bednarski v Bednarski, 141 Mich.
App. 15 (1985). Gulyas v Gulyas, 75 Mich. App. 138 (1977): Hon.
Dorothy Riley in her dissent states, parenthetically, that this factor should
not be used by a trial judge to impose work ethic notions. Fletcher v
Fletcher, 200 Mich. App. 505 (1993) states that the court may not use
marital affairs of which the child has no knowledge against such parent with
respect to morality. The trial judge used morality test wrongfully and in
addition let it influence the court in balancing the other factors as well. On
appeal, (Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich. 871 (1994), the Supreme
Court did not disturb this ruling, but added the following: "[moral fitness],
like all the other statutory factors, relates to a person's fitness as
a parent. To evaluate parental fitness, courts must look to the parent child
relationship and the effect that the conduct at issue will have on that
relationship. Thus, the question under factor f is not "who is the morally
superior adult"; the question concerns the parties' relatives fitness to provide
for their child, given the moral disposition of each party as demonstrated by
individual conduct. We hold that in making that finding, questionable conduct is
relevant to factor f only if is a type of conduct that necessarily has a
significant influence on how one will function as a
parent." In making
that determination, the court refers to this article as it originally appeared
in 21 Mich Fam LJ 15 (Oct, 1994) in footnote 6. The Supreme Court states this
article "provides a list of conduct that, although not exhaustive, represents
the type of morally questionable conduct, relevant to one's moral fitness as a
parent. It includes: verbal abuse, drinking problems, driving record, physical
or sexual abuse of children, and other illegal or offensive behaviors. While the
list also includes consideration of 'extra-martial conduct known by the
children,' we believe that today's decision sufficiently addresses the relevance
of that fact." Bowers v Bowers, 198 Mich. App. 320 (1993) shows
that a variety of subjects can be used under this category, specifically, the
court may consider a drinking problem, arrest record, living with child's baby
sitter, allowing son to drink from his beer, verbal abuse, and lying about past
alcohol record. Helms v Helms, 185 Mich. App. 680 (1990), allows
consideration of a circumstance where plaintiff is pregnant, unmarried, and
living with her boyfriend, since the case is not one of unmarried cohabitation
"standing alone"; plaintiff's pregnancy is an aggravating factor. Since moral
fitness was not the sole basis for the decision, it was proper to make a custody
award taking this factor into account as one of the relevant factors. Snyder
v Snyder, 170 Mich. App. 801 (1988), states that in a case where the
court is considering morality as an issue in determining visitation rights, it
is error for the judge to cancel visitation with father when he moves in with a
woman to whom he is not married. Lifestyle cannot be sole factor by which
morality is judged. Truitt v Truitt, 172 Mich. App. 38 (1988)
explains that cohabitation with girlfriend does not of itself mean the party is
immoral. A now out of print publication by the State Court Administrative Office
has this to say: "Is there a pattern of behavior in the realm of morals and
ethics on the part of either party that might have an adverse effect on the
moral or ethical development of the children? This question may be answered in
regard to two basic issues: example and psychological impact. In the first,
repeated illegal or immoral behavior conducted by the parent in the presence of
the child, or behavior of which the child is likely to learn, can serve as a
negative example to the child and may encourage such behavior on the child's
part. In the second instance, behavior on the part of the parent such as use of
drugs or repeated liaisons with multiple partners could cause neglect of the
child's basic needs or disruption in the child's ability to bond with
significant adult figures...it is only the task of the investigator to note any
differences between the behavior of the parents which impacts on the
moral or ethical development of the child."
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